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EIGHTEEN IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER: WHY THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT REQUIRES PROTECTION FOR YOUTH AGED
EIGHTEEN TO TWENTY-FIVE
Tirza A. Mullin*
ABSTRACT
The Eighth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. This Note argues that any punishment of
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds is cruel and unusual without considering their
youthfulness at every stage of the criminal process, and that it is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment for these youths to be automatically treated as fullydeveloped adults. This Note will explore in depth how juveniles differ from adults,
both socially and scientifically, and how the criminal justice system fails every
youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five by subjecting them to criminal, rather than
juvenile, court without considering their youthfulness and diminished capacity.
This Note proposes three reforms that, implemented together, aim to remedy this
Eighth Amendment violation. First, the Supreme Court should apply the seminal
cases of Miller, Roper, and Graham to eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds.
Second, all states should extend the age of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five,
processing offenders twenty-five and younger through the juvenile system
accordingly. Finally, every actor in the system—including courts, lawyers, and
legislatures—should label eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as “youth” and
consider their age at every stage of the criminal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s American culture tells us that one becomes an adult
upon the eighteenth birthday, which is why the criminal justice system has traditionally set the age of juvenile majority at eighteen. In
1
Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this line
may be over or under-inclusive but stated a “line must be drawn.”2
A line must be drawn, but that line must be changed if it is unconstitutional.
States are responsible for setting the upper juvenile jurisdiction
age limit, and the maximum age is eighteen or lower in forty-nine
3
states. Vermont recently raised their majority youthful offender
status age to twenty-one—the highest age of majority in the
4
country. Scientific research, however, suggests that the human
5
brain does not fully develop until age twenty-five. This arbitrary
state-drawn line leaves youths aged eighteen- to twenty-five vulner-

1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Id. at 574.
3. John Kelly, In Another Big Year for “Raise the Age” Laws, One State Now Considers All
Teens as Juveniles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 25, 2018), https://chronicleofsocial
change.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-justice-raise-the-age-vermont-missouri-statelegislation.
4. Id.; see also Governor Signs Law Creating More Rational Juvenile Justice Policies in Vermont,
DEP’T FOR CHILD. & FAMS.: DCF BLOG (June 1, 2016), https://dcf.vermont.gov/dcf-blog/
governor-signs-law-creating-more-rational-juvenile-justice-policies-vermont.
5. Although there is some debate on the exact age, most research indicates that the
brain continues to develop into the mid-twenties up to age twenty-five. See Mariam Arain et
al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 449–61
(2013); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469 (2000); David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles As Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 71, 73 (2013); Kevin J. Holt, The Inbetweeners: Standardizing Juvenileness and Recognizing
Emerging Adulthood for Sentencing Purposes After Miller, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2015).
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able to the harsh contours of the adult criminal system instead of
the juvenile system where they belong.
The distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal system
is important. The juvenile justice system is focused on
rehabilitation, while the adult criminal system is shaped primarily
by punitive ideologies. The Supreme Court treats youth
“delinquents” differently than their adult “criminal” counterparts,
placing delinquents in detention centers whose mission is to
rehabilitate, not to punish. 6 The Court has recognized that rather
than a “right to be punished, young people, specifically
adolescents, instead uniquely possess the quite different—indeed
in many ways antithetical—constitutional ‘right to a meaningful
opportunity to be rehabilitated.’” 7 A primary justification behind
the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile system is that “kids are
8
different.” The Supreme Court has indicated that “juveniles are
generally—though not necessarily in every case—less morally
9
culpable than adults who commit the same crimes.” This reduced
culpability does not magically vanish at age eighteen. In fact,
scientific research suggests that the differences between children
and adults that render children less morally culpable persist until
10
approximately age twenty-five.
Part I of this Note will outline the scientific and societal support
for the notion that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are, in many
ways, more similar to children than adults. Part II will explain how
automatically treating these individuals as adults without consideration of their youthfulness violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on excessive punishments. The final part of this Note, Part III, will
propose three reforms to remedy this Eight Amendment violation.
These solutions, working in tandem, would mandate individualized
consideration of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds’ age throughout
their interactions with the criminal justice system.

6. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1967) (describing the rehabilitative history of juvenile court laws).
7. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
570 (2005) (claiming that from “a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult” because a juvenile’s irresponsible acts are less
morally reprehensible).
8. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 526.
9. Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. L. REV. 457, 499 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 88 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring)).
10. See, e.g., Pimentel, supra note 5, at 73.
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I. EIGHTEEN IS NOT A MAGIC NUMBER
A. Miller Line of Cases
Courts have recognized the differences in culpability between
young offenders and fully mature adults for decades. The Supreme
Court issued a series of landmark decisions regarding juvenile cul11
12
pability in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Ala13
bama. In each case, the Court found three differences between juveniles and adults: juveniles (1) have a “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” often resulting in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”; (2) are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure”; and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not
14
as well formed as that of an adult.” These key differences suggest
that youth are less culpable for their actions than their adult counterparts, and therefore the traditional justifications for criminal
punishment—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—are less
applicable to young criminal defendants. The Court decided to focus on rehabilitative rationales accordingly, which do not result in
the death penalty or automatic life without the possibility of pa15
role. Rehabilitation is considered more fitting for juvenile of16
fenders because they have “greater prospects for reform.” In each
of these groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions, however, the
juvenile before the justices was under the age of eighteen, and
therefore the corresponding juvenile protections are limited to de17
fendants under that age of majority. The Supreme Court has yet
to confront a case that would allow it to directly reconsider extending Roper’s protections to defendants older than eighteen.
In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons, that the
death penalty for juveniles younger than eighteen was categorically
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
18
cruel and unusual punishment. The Roper Court recognized that

11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
12. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
13. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
14. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see
also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
15. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
16. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
17. In Roper, the defendant was seventeen years old. 543 U.S. at 556. In Graham, the
defendant was sixteen years old. 560 U.S. at 53. In Miller, the defendants were fourteen years
old. 567 U.S. at 465.
18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
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the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns eighteen,” but nonetheless stated
19
that a line needed to be drawn somewhere. The Roper Court
chose to draw the line at eighteen because it is “the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
20
adulthood.” However, the Court did not have access to today’s
21
neuroscience research regarding adolescent brain development.
Then, the Court decided Graham v. Florida in 2010 ruling that
life imprisonment for juvenile non-homicide offenders was uncon22
stitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court noted the
same differences between children and adults as the Roper Court
and determined that “these differences render suspect any conclu23
sion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders:”
The Graham Court noted three significant developmental
gaps between adolescents and adults: impulsivity linked to
developmental factors, susceptibility to external pressures,
and a still-developing identity. Indeed, what made these
youthful traits salient in the justice context, according to
the Court, was that they at once lessened a child’s “moral
culpability” and increased the probability that with time
and attendant neurological development, the child’s “defi24
ciencies will be reformed.”
The Supreme Court then borrowed the Roper Court’s age cut-off to
prohibit mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile of25
fenders under the age of eighteen in Miller v. Alabama. The Court
did not bar discretionary life without parole sentences for juveniles,
but rather “mandate[d] only that a sentence follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstanc26
es—before imposing a particular penalty.” It adopted the foundational principles of Roper and Graham, holding that severe
sentences could not be imposed on juveniles “as though they were
not children,” and therefore mandatory life without parole sentences were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.27
19. Id. at 574.
20.
Id.
21. Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29,
2018).
22. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
23. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
24. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does A Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law
and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 774 (2016) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69).
25. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
26. Id. at 483.
27. Id. at 474.
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Again, the Court defined “juvenile” as those under eighteen without considering moving the arbitrary line or providing evidence to
28
support its adoption.
B. Brain Development
The underlying concerns about the developmental differences
between adults and youths that animated these landmark decisions
extend beyond age eighteen. The traditional age cut-off at eighteen is a social construction, rather than a scientific one. In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court acknowledged this by stating, “[t]he age of
[eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many pur29
poses between childhood and adulthood.” Additionally, in the
seminal case of Miller v. Alabama, when the Supreme Court asked
counsel where to draw the line between juveniles and adults, counsel answered, “I would draw it at eighteen . . . because we’ve done
30
that previously; we’ve done that consistently.” This social construction is actually rather inconsistent, considering one is not allowed to drink alcohol until age twenty-one, cannot rent a car until
age twenty-five, and is not required to obtain personal health in31
surance until age twenty-six. These varying age restrictions make
it clear that our society does not agree on an age that marks the
onset of adulthood. Scientific research provides a more compelling
answer.
Recent brain studies reveal that youths aged eighteen- to twentyfive have many of the same characteristics that make children less
culpable for criminal behavior. There have been a substantial
number of recently-published psychological studies and legal
scholarship recognizing that the brain, most importantly the prefrontal cortex, continues developing until the mid-twenties, rather
than stopping at age eighteen. 32 The prefrontal cortex is essential
for both impulse control and decision-making in complex or highstress situations and “[t]he fact remains that young people between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five do not have fully-developed
capacity to control impulses and make rational choices.” 33

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.; Cruz, 2018 WL 1541898, at *17–18.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (No. 10-9646).
Pimentel, supra note 5, at 83–85.
Id. at 84; see Arain et al., supra note 5; see generally Arnett, supra note 5.
Pimentel, supra note 5, at 84.
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Reduced juvenile culpability has commonly been attributed to
34
the underdevelopment of the pre-frontal cortex. Children and
youth are less culpable than fully-developed adults because their
delayed brain development makes them prone to poor-decision
making and peer pressure, reduces their understanding of longterm consequences of their behavior, and means they lack the self35
control to refrain from engaging in risky behavior. This is because
“[t]he prefrontal cortex is central to what psychologists call ‘executive functions,’ advanced thinking processes that are employed in
planning ahead and controlling impulses, and in weighing the
costs and benefits of decisions before acting.” 36 The less mature
parts of the prefrontal cortex have been shown to influence
youth’s actions by “diminish[ing] [the] capacity to exercise selfcontrol to inhibit inappropriate actions, desires, and emotions in
favor of appropriate ones.” 37 Studies show that this part of the
brain causes youth to rely on “gut reactions, instinct, and overall
emotional responses” in contrast to adults who rely on “judgment,
reason, and planning” when they act. 38 As the prefrontal cortex develops, this diminished capacity will fade and socially acceptable
behavior will override emotionally driven behavior. 39 In this way,
before the brain fully matures, a youth will likely “grow out of antisocial behavior patterns” which “renders him susceptible to rehabilitation” 40 and thus renders the personalities of those aged eighteen- to twenty-five “more transitory, less fixed.” 41
Since these characteristics make eighteen- to twenty-five-yearolds “in many respects . . . more similar to juveniles than to
adults,” 42 they are more receptive to rehabilitation just like juve34. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 859, 860 (1999); see generally Elizabeth C.
Kingston, Validating Montgomery’s Recharacterization of Miller: An End to LWOP for Juveniles,
38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 23 (2016).
35. See Alex A. Stamm, Young Adults are Different Too: Why and How We Can Create a Better
Justice System for Young People Age 18 to 25, 95 TEX. L. REV. 72, 74 (2017); see generally Kingston,
supra note 34; JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability,
A.B.A. (Jan. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf.
36. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 44
(2008).
37. Cohen et al., supra note 24, at 783. “Taken together, the findings suggest that young
adulthood is a developmental period when cognitive capacity is still vulnerable to negative
emotional influences.” Id. at 787.
38. Melissa S. Caulum, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience,
Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729, 741 (discussing Sarah
Spinks, One Reason Teens Respond Differently to the World: Immature Brain Circuitry,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/work/onereason.html).
39. Cohen et al., supra note 24 at 784.
40. Stamm, supra note 35, at 74.
41. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
42. JAMES C. HOWELL ET AL., BULLETIN 5: YOUNG OFFENDERS AND AN EFFECTIVE
RESPONSE IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEMS: WHAT HAPPENS, WHAT SHOULD
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niles. A child without a fully-developed brain is better suited for
rehabilitation because “with time and attendant neurological development,” the child’s “deficiencies will be reformed.” 43 Additionally, because their unformed character is easily malleable—
especially by social and peer influence—they are “better candidates
for rehabilitation.” 44 In fact, “there is a growing consensus that adolescence is likely to be a period of heightened brain plasticity—the
capacity of the brain to change in response to experience—not unlike the first few years of life.” 45 Youth are more likely to remold
their behaviors as they fully develop since “the same peak in dopamine that makes dangerous behaviors so appealing also increases an adolescent’s ability to learn and to rehabilitate.” 46 Some studies suggest that focusing on rehabilitation for youth in this age
group decreases recidivism rates, highlighting one of the many po47
tential benefits of a rehabilitative approach.
The final stages of brain maturation typically occur around age
twenty-five. 48 Until offenders are developmentally mature, they
cannot be fully accountable for their actions. 49 They are therefore
similarly situated to a child when considering diminished criminal

HAPPEN, AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW 24 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/242935.pdf.
43. Cohen et al., supra note 24 at 774; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
44. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 (2016). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569
(explaining that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure”); Carly Loomis-Gustafson, Adjusting the BrightLine Age of Accountability Within the Criminal Justice System: Raising the Age of Majority to Age 21
Based on the Conclusions of Scientific Studies Regarding Neurological Development and Culpability, 55
DUQ. L. REV. 221, 237 (2017) (“The juvenile brain’s sensitivity to social influences makes the
focus on rehabilitation in these years the key to encouraging substantive behavioral changes.”).
45. Scott et al., supra note 44, at 652.
46. See Loomis-Gustafson, supra note 44, at 233.
47. Scott et al., supra note 44, at 663 n.144 (explaining that Colorado’s Youthful Offender Service houses youth aged eighteen and nineteen in facilities which provide “specially designed programs and services that focus on academics, rehabilitation, and the development of prosocial behaviors and reentry planning. The recidivism rates of offenders who
successfully complete the YOS program (most offenders) is far better than comparable offenders.”).
48. See Arain et al., supra note 5; Pimentel, supra note 5, at 85. See generally Arnett, supra
note 5.
49. It is true that developmental maturity is a process, not a specific point in time. This
is why it is important to emphasize that some eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, just like some
children under the age of eighteen, achieve developmental maturity much earlier than others. If an individualized consideration reveals that this is the case, the youth can still be
waived to adult court just like our current juvenile system already allows. See Caulum, supra
note 38, at 748 (“[W]aiver is based on a flexible approach to sentencing and a determination of the juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation.”).
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culpability. This diminished capacity is supported by neuroscience which “tells us that we should expect some irrational, emotion-driven behavior from emerging adults, those aged eighteen to
twenty-five, and that it is not until their late twenties that it is reasonable to expect them to have the brain development necessary to
behave like fully rational adults.” 51 This growing research on brain
development should be considered when determining appropriate
punishments for criminal defendants under twenty-five.
Research shows that once the brain is fully developed, criminal
behavior significantly decreases. This is what many researchers re52
fer to as the “age-crime curve.” The age-crime curve tells us that,
in general, a person’s propensity for criminal behavior begins
around “puberty, peaks at age twenty, and then decreases” signifi53
cantly during the mid-twenties. Therefore, “adolescents and individuals in their early twenties are more likely than either children
54
or adults to engage in risky behavior.” The peak age for crime in55
volvement is younger than twenty-five for most types of crime.
Although we see a high amount of crime committed prior to age
twenty-five, the age-crime curve indicates that most will desist from
56
crime either in late adolescence or early adulthood. Only an estimated five percent of youth offenders will continue committing
57
crimes in adulthood. This is because adolescent experimentation
58
in risk-taking is transient for most individuals.
Given this behavioral trend, by sentencing youth aged eighteento twenty-five to the same lengthy sentences as adults, too many
young offenders are sitting in prisons when they likely no longer
59
pose a danger to society. These offenders tend to abstain from

50. See id. at 743 (“Because the prefrontal cortex governs impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, and foresight of consequences, it is responsible for the very characteristics that may make one morally culpable.”).
51. Pimentel, supra note 5, at 84.
52. E.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53.
53. Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions About
Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCI. 513, 515 fig.1 (2013). See also
Liza Little, Miller v. Alabama: A Proposed Solution for a Court that Feels Strongly Both Ways, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (2015).
54. Steinberg, supra note 53, at 515.
55. Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Variation, Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY: ON
THE ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY 377, 377 (Kevin M. Beaver et al. eds.,
2014), https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/60294_Chapter_23.pdf.
56. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53.
57. Id.
58. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417, 421 (2000).
59.
See Stamm, supra note 35, at 75 (“A large longitudinal study of serious young offenders aged 14 to 25 found no difference in recidivism rates (among comparable youth)
from imprisonment instead of probation, or from longer terms of imprisonment.”).
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crime as their brains develop, “reducing any incapacitation bene60
fits of long sentences.” Additionally, “aging out” of crime is much
more likely if the youth has “enhanced social connections” with the
opportunity to develop “an identity, sense of purpose, or self61
awareness” which is improbable if the youth is in a prison cell.
Placing youth of this age group into the punitive adult system can
actually increase the probability of recidivism because “the susceptibility of the juvenile brain to peer influences that makes rehabilitation so effective may backfire when the youth is placed in a negative environment, such as the adult prison system.” 62 Since the
neurological research and age-crime curve shows that youths aged
eighteen- to twenty-five are likely to be rehabilitated back to a
crime-free life, focusing on treatment instead of punishment has
the potential to benefit the offender and society in general to give
youth a chance to redeem themselves by becoming productive
adults.
C. Evolving Trends of Raising the Age
These recent breakthroughs in brain research have contributed
to the legal community’s increasing support for raising the juvenile
age beyond eighteen. In 2018, the District Court of Connecticut
held in Cruz v. United States that Miller applied to eighteen-year63
olds. Significantly, though in dicta, the court recognized there
could be a justification for Miller and Roper to extend beyond age
64
eighteen. The court found the consistent trend acknowledging
that adolescents over age eighteen are different from fully65
developed adults to be persuasive. It noted that a Kentucky state
court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional “as applied” to
those under twenty-one based on a “consistent direction of
change” showing that the “national consensus is growing more and
more opposed to the death penalty as applied to defendants eight66
een (18) to twenty-one (21).” The Kentucky Court concluded this
60. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 669, 714.
61. See DANIEL P. KEATING, SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE REGARDING THE
IMPACT OF EARLY TRAUMA ON ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND RISK BEHAVIOR 9 (Aug.
2018).
62. Loomis-Gustafson, supra note 44, at 239.
63. Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29,
2018) (holding that mandatory life without parole sentences were unconstitutional for
eighteen-year-old offenders).
64. Id.
65. Id. at *21.
66. Id. (quoting Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional,
No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *3 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 7th Div. Aug. 1, 2017)).
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based on the fact that since Roper, there has not only been an increased abolition of the death penalty in general but that seven
states now have a de facto prohibition on executing youth under
67
age twenty-one.
The Cruz court also noted that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia now recognize an extended age jurisdiction for juvenile
68
courts beyond age eighteen. Additionally, it found persuasive that
the American Bar Association urged the death penalty be ruled
unconstitutional for individuals under twenty-one due to the “scientific understanding of adolescent brain development” and “legislative developments in the legal treatment of individuals in late
69
adolescence.” The court acknowledged the scientific research
showing the brain is not fully developed until early to mid70
twenties. Testimony from adolescent development expert Dr.
71
Laurence Steinberg revealed that an individual’s impulse control
as well as emotional regulation continues to develop until the mid72
twenties. Dr. Steinberg’s research showed greater risk-taking and
reward-sensitive behavior among youths when in company of their
73
peers up until about age twenty-four. He noted that after age
twenty-four, adults begin to refrain from this behavior and behave
in a similar capacity whether they are alone or in the company of
peers. 74
In conformity with progressive caselaw, multiple states have been
experimenting with different reforms to account for the harmful
gap in protections for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds in the criminal system. For example, in 2016, Vermont’s governor signed a bill
making any juvenile under twenty-one charged with a nonviolent
75
crime eligible for juvenile offender status. It also requires the Department of Corrections to provide separate facilities for any offender age twenty-five and below, meaning eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds may only be housed in facilities specifically designated for
76
youths. The bill was motivated by scientific research revealing that
the brain is not fully developed until the mid-twenties and that
“[t]he eighteenth birthday is not magical; you do not suddenly be-

67. Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 2017 WL
8792559, at *2.
68. Cruz, 2018 WL 1541898, at *22.
69. Id. at *21.
70. Id. at *22.
71. More information about Dr. Steinberg can be found on his website. LAURENCE
STEINBERG, https://laurencesteinberg.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2020).
72. Id. at *23.
73. Id. at *24.
74. Id.
75. H. 96, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016).
76. Id. See also DEP’T FOR CHILD. & FAMS.: DCF BLOG, supra note 4.
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77

come a full-fledged adult.” Vermont hopes to emphasize rehabilitation for these older offenders to prevent them from committing
78
future crimes and assisted them in aging out of criminal behavior.
Additionally, there have been bills proposed in Illinois, Connecticut, and Massachusetts to raise the juvenile jurisdiction age to
79
twenty-one. Both Brooklyn and San Francisco have recently experimented with separate court systems for youths aged sixteen to
twenty-four focusing on the developmental and neuroscience80
based factors that make children different from adults. In these
unique court systems, there are dedicated defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and social workers who are trained on neurosci81
ence developments by experts in the field.
Connecticut has also recently developed a new repurposed housing unit called Cheshire Correctional Institute, where staff members work with men aged eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds and fo82
cus on reintegration and rehabilitation. The Institute uses a
program called Truthfulness, Respect, Understanding, and Elevating (TRUE) which is “designed specifically to address the needs of
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-old offenders” and helps inmates de83
velop through family programs, education, and mentorship.
These housing units were created because “[y]ounger criminals often act on impulse and are better served by a nurturing, supportive
84
environment, rather than one that is strictly punitive.” Research is
still in progress regarding the effect of the program on recidivism,
but “disciplinary issues inside the TRUE unit are virtually nonexistent” while outside the unit, “[y]ounger inmates account for about
twenty-five percent of disciplinary incidents.” 85 As a result of the
program’s success, Connecticut is hoping to expand the housing
86
throughout the state and across genders.
Many other countries are following this trend. Young people can
be treated as juveniles up to age twenty-one in Germany, twenty-

77. David Jordan, Vermont Rolls Out a New Idea to Rehabilitate Young Offenders, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 6, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/
0706/Vermont-rolls-out-a-new-idea-to-rehabilitate-young-offenders.
78. Id.
79. Kelly, supra note 3.
80. Tim Requarth, Neuroscience is Changing the Debate over what Role Age Should Play in the
Courts, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2016 10:01 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/29/
young-brains-neuroscience-juvenile-inmates-criminal-justice-449000.html.
81. Id.
82. Prison Unit for Young Inmates Seen as National Model, WTNH NEWS (May 31, 2018
03:42 AM), https://www.wtnh.com/news/connecticut/prison-unit-for-young-inmates-seenas-national-model/1209960110.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.

SUMMER 2020]

819

Eighteen Is Not a Magic Number
87

three in the Netherlands, and twenty-five in Switzerland. The
Netherlands even uses forensic and probation psychologists to
evaluate and recommend whether the youth should be treated as a
88
juvenile or an adult. Additionally, the Sentencing Advisory Council of Victoria in the United Kingdom has advocated for a separate
system for youths up to age twenty-five that focuses more on “specific developmental needs in order to help the offender’s rehabili89
tation and re-integration.” Trends in the United States and in
foreign countries recognize that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds
would benefit from a more rehabilitative criminal justice system.
II. ACCOUNTING FOR YOUTHFULNESS UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
A. Kids Must Be Treated like Kids
Roper, Graham, and Miller all establish a constitutional principle
that children are unique, and therefore must be treated differently
from adults in the context of punishment and sentencing. The
Court in Graham stated that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the
Eighth Amendment” so “criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”90
Although these cases defined “children” as persons under age
eighteen, the Court’s reasoning applies to eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds as well, as discussed in Part I. Therefore, to not treat
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths violates Eighth Amendment principles. The Court needs to revisit the age cutoff, or else it
risks perpetuating constitutional violations against this group of offenders. There have been numerous articles arguing that drawing
the line at eighteen is problematic. 91 This Note agrees with that
proposition, but further argues that it is required by the Eighth
Amendment for individuals under the age of twenty-five to have
their youthfulness considered at every stage of the criminal process
87. Jordan, supra note 77.
88. Vincent Schiraldi, Raising Age to 23: It Works for the Dutch, CRIME
REP. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/03/27/raising-juvenile-age-to-23produces-promising-results-for-dutch-us-researchers.
89. KING’S COLLEGE LONDON, Young Adults and Criminal Justice: International Norms and
Practices (2011), https://www.t2a.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/T2A-InternationalNorms-and-Practces.pdf.
90. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).
91. See Kevin J. Holt, The Inbetweeners: Standardizing Juvenileness and Recognizing Emerging
Adulthood for Sentencing Purposes After Miller, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2015). See also
Kelsey B. Shust, Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving Young Adults, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2014); Stamm, supra note 35.
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in order to avoid excessive punishments. It is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment for these youths to be automatically
treated as if they were adults, and each eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-old requires individualized consideration of their youthfulness
92
and developmental capacity prior to conviction.
Juveniles do not have a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile courts. The Eighth Amendment does, however, require that
youthful defendants receive age-appropriate punishment proportional to his or her culpability. If the defendant has diminished
culpability because of his or her young age and is receptive to rehabilitation, the court is obligated to treat the youthful defendant
differently than an adult and take youthfulness into account at every stage of the process, not just at sentencing. This includes eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds.
B. The Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Excessive Punishments
Currently, eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are typically tried
and punished in our criminal justice system without consideration
93
of their lessened culpability due to age. The United States Constitution prohibits this; more specifically, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments that are excessive in relation to the moral
94
culpability of the offender. The Court decides whether the Eighth
Amendment is violated by viewing proportionality “according to
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 95 The Court determined in Roper, Graham, and Miller that the necessary age cutoff should remain at eighteen because
that has usually been the line drawn in society between childhood
and adulthood. 96 The Court must reexamine this premise and update its previous Eighth Amendment holdings given the constantly
developing neuroscience research and society’s evolving views of
acceptable punishments for youths. 97

92. Although some eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds may have the requisite developmental maturity to be fully culpable for their crimes, that is a determination for the jury or
judge to decide. The burden should be on the prosecutor to show an eighteen- to twentyfive-year-old has the developmental capacity of an adult.
93. See Kelsey B. Shust, Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving Young Adults, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 701 (2014) (advocating for a case-by-case evaluation of a defendant’s youthfulness for defendants under age twenty-five).
94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
95. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012).
96. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
97. The Court regularly engages in this sort of reexamination. See, e.g., Graham, 560
U.S. 48 (holding the Eighth Amendment categorically bans juvenile nonhomicide offenders
from receiving mandatory life without the possibility of parole); Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (extending Graham’s previous holding to include juvenile homicide crimes due to evolving stand-
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1. Why the Eighth Amendment Requires Miller, Graham, and Roper to
Apply to Eighteen- to Twenty-Five-Year-Olds
As previously indicated, youth is a major factor in deciding
whether a punishment is constitutionally excessive under the
Eighth Amendment. Justice Roberts stated in Graham, “an offender’s juvenile status can play a central role in considering a sentence’s proportionality.” 98 In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court
looked at and relied heavily on brain science to determine that juveniles have diminished culpability. 99 This research found youth
have certain characteristics that make harsh punishments disproportionate, and therefore violate the Eighth Amendment. These
characteristics include diminished maturity and responsibility that
leads to risk-taking behavior, vulnerability to peer pressure, and
underdeveloped character that is more prone to rehabilitation.100
According to the Court, each of these characteristics demonstrate
an ability to be rehabilitated.
The Court has been reluctant to impose irrevocable sentences
on a group that has a high propensity for change after neurological development, precisely because the punishment then becomes
disproportionate and constitutionally excessive. 101 Since we cannot
be sure of a youth’s potential, cutting off the prospect of growth
defies our sense of morals:
“[T]he malleability of adolescence” offers the prospect that
an adolescent offender can alter his life course and develop
a moral character as an adult. Executing a juvenile before
he is a fully formed person and before we can reliably predict what sort of adult he will become forecloses the chance
for this development and thus cannot be a reasoned moral
response to the defendant’s character. 102
As argued in Part I, current research shows the brain is underdeveloped until age twenty-five, resulting in an inability to fully assess

ards of decency). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (denying a categorical exemption from the death penalty for the intellectually disabled); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (rejecting Penry and holding the Eighth Amendment categorically bans intellectually disabled offenders from receiving the death penalty in light of society’s evolving
standards of decency); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (updating the definition of intellectual disability due to evolving standards of decency in the medical and social community).
98. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474.
99. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
100. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
101. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
102. Brief for Respondent at 27, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
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consequences, diminished capacity to make rational decisions, and
103
increased susceptibility to peer pressure. Youths under twentyfive therefore possess the same characteristics and potential for reform that the Court found persuasive in Miller, Graham, and Roper,
finding Eighth Amendment violations and banning the death penalty and mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles. 104
Therefore, handing out these sentences to offenders aged eighteen- to twenty-five must also violate the Eighth Amendment. 105
The death penalty and mandatory life without parole are sentences that offer “no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope” 106—a flat out rejection of rehabilitation with no possibility of reintegration into society. It is impossible to close off the possibility of a youth offender
transitioning into a reformed adult who will not commit crimes
upon release given their incomplete brain development. These
sentences deny the possibility of release even though research
shows the propensity to commit crime significantly decreases after
age twenty-five. 107 The finality of these sentences takes away all possibility of growth and development, violating the Eighth Amendment rights of not only juveniles, but also eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds with those same prospects of rehabilitation and reform.
2. Why the Eighth Amendment Requires Kids To Be Labeled as Kids
The Eighth Amendment also requires eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds to be labeled as youths throughout criminal proceedings.
The discussion above shows that the sentencing decisions in Roper,
Graham, and Miller should also apply to eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds. However, the sentence itself is not the only stage of criminal procedure that must be critically examined to prevent excessive youth punishment. Justice Kagan suggested this in her Miller
opinion, noting that treating children like adults throughout their
criminal proceedings “ignores that [the offender] might have been

103. See supra Part I Section II pp. 106–07.
104. Although some of this research was available at the time of these groundbreaking
Supreme Court cases, those Courts were only asked to address youth under age eighteen.
105. As previously mentioned, there is a variation in developmental capacities among
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, but the same is true for those under eighteen and the Supreme Court had decided, as a class, juveniles under eighteen cannot receive these sentences because they are so severe, even if that is over-inclusive. Therefore, these sentences are
unconstitutional applied to a class that as a whole, generally, has an underdeveloped neurological system.
106. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
107. See supra Part I Section II pp. 107–08.

SUMMER 2020]

Eighteen Is Not a Magic Number

823

charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
108
associated with youth.”
Unlike juveniles, eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are entitled to
a jury trial. If juries do not consider the defendant’s youthfulness
and diminished culpability, the defendant is more likely to be convicted for crimes that carry excessive sentences. The judge at sentencing may have little discretion to lower sentences for these severe crimes, especially if mandatory minimums apply. Additionally,
it is typically juries who make sentencing determinations in death
penalty cases. If age is not considered throughout the process, the
ability to be charged and convicted of a lesser offense, or to not receive a death sentence, may vanish. To prevent this, eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds must be labeled as youth (or even children, kids,
emerging adults) from the outset, not as adults or even young adults,
and scientific evidence must be given to juries in support of this label in order to avoid disproportionate punishments. 109
From the moment a youthful offender comes into contact with
the criminal justice system, their age must play a role in their case.
This is true for juvenile defendants under age eighteen, 110 because
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at
a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.” 111 Youths are at
high risk for erroneous convictions and excessive punishments because of their limited understanding of the system, unwillingness
to cooperate due to wariness of trust in adults, and their lack of
maturity. Youthful defendants have a special difficulty with legal
representation, because “[t]hey are less likely than adults to work
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.” 112 This may
diminish the quality of the defendant’s representation, and a court
or jury may be more likely to convict or provide an undeserving
punishment. If counsel, the judge, and the jury were required to
consider the defendant’s youthfulness and immaturity, these risks
could be mitigated.

108. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
109. The labeling theory in criminology studies has proven that labels can have highly
influential effects on persons’ mindsets and behavior. See Charles W. Thomas & Donna M.
Bishop, The Effect of Formal and Informal Sanctions on Delinquency: A Longitudinal Comparison of
Labeling and Deterrence Theories, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1222 (1984).
110. Though, again, there is considerable developmental variation among eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds, the same goes for those under age eighteen. See infra note 108. That is
why youth should be a considered factor, not determinative, and it should be the burden of
the prosecution to show why the particular youthful defendant is developmentally mature
and should be treated as an adult.
111. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
112. Id.
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Youths are also vulnerable when they are given their Miranda
113
rights and are more likely to give confessions under pressure.
This is why the Court ruled in J.D.B v. North Carolina that a juve114
nile’s age should be considered in the Miranda custody analysis.
The Court reasoned that the particular susceptibilities stemming
from a child’s age requires treating the youth’s confession differently than an adult’s confession. 115 Court’s performing a Miranda
custody analysis ask whether an objectively reasonable officer
would have known of the child’s youth and particular susceptibility. 116 Eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, who have the same “particular susceptibilities,” are automatically excluded from J.D.B.’s protections. By not labeling these offenders as children, courts can
ignore age during the custody analysis and erroneously admit an
innocuous confession, resulting in an unfair conviction and sentence. Youthfulness is considered in other similar totality-of-thecircumstances tests, such as those assessing consent and lineups.
These various stages throughout the criminal procedure process
can significantly impact the youth’s eventual punishment.
It follows that if eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are not labeled
as youths, the sentencer will be inclined to impose a stricter sentence. Without this label, they will be less likely to believe the defendant can be rehabilitated and will focus instead on the ideologies of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. The Court in
Roper, Graham, and Miller determined that these penological justifications for punishments are less applicable to juvenile offenders
because of their diminished culpability.117 Retribution is less compelling because youth are less blameworthy. 118 Deterrence cannot
justify punishment since youth’s inability to fully assess consequences means they are less likely to consider punishment before
committing a crime. 119 Lastly, incapacitation is irrelevant because
“[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’” 120 Therefore,
judges sentencing juveniles focus on rehabilitation and will usually
look for alternatives to incarceration. When sentencing defendants
over the age of eighteen, rehabilitation is typically not the focus

113. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
114. Id. at 281.
115. See id. at 272–73.
116. See id. at 274.
117. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
118. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 472–73 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73).
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and the other justifications for punishment come to the forefront.
Youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five have a similar diminished culpability and should receive the same focus on rehabilitation as juveniles. Labeling them as youths will promote rehabilitationmotivated sentencing.
It is also likely that jurors will be more sympathetic toward the
defendant if they are properly informed of the defendant’s diminished culpability. It is a widely-held proposition that scientific research is significantly persuasive for juries, 121 and scientific research
on youths’ underdeveloped brains and diminished culpability
could significantly impact jury deliberation. Without being sufficiently informed of this research, jurors might not be able to appropriately consider the youthfulness of eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-old offenders. Roper, Graham, and Miller all suggest that this
sort of uninformed jury deliberation is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 122
The role of the jury is especially important to Eight Amendment
challenges in death penalty cases, because in looking at evolving
standards of decency, “the jury . . . is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.” 123 Jury decisions are therefore a compelling indicator of
society’s acceptance of certain types of punishment for particular
groups of offenders. Jury-imposed death penalty sentences are particularly reflective, because these require a case-by-case sentencing
decision. This is because “[a] central feature of death penalty sentencing is a particular assessment of the circumstances of the crime
and the characteristics of the offender. The system is designed to
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including
youth, in every case.” 124 Before the categorical ban announced in
Roper, the jury still considered youth as a mitigating factor when
imposing the death penalty for eligible juveniles when that mitigation evidence was presented. 125 It was thus valid to infer that, in
those cases, the jury’s decision reflected their acceptance of capital
121. See, e.g., John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert
Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 (1992) (“[I]t
is widely agreed that propositions perceived as ‘scientific’ by the jury possess an unusually
high degree of persuasive power.”). “There is virtual unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be ‘scientific’ in nature will have particularly persuasive effect.” Id. at 367 n.91 (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1974)).
122. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
123. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 (1977)).
124. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
125. See Seung Oh Kang, The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance: Preservation of
the Capital Defendant’s Constitutional Rights Pursuant to Traditional Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 748 (1994).
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punishment for that particular age group. Because our current
criminal procedure processes do not account for eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds’ diminished culpability, however, death penalty sentences for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are inherently less
reflective of contemporary values and do not properly reflect the
jury’s true acceptance of the death penalty for this particular age
group. The Roper decision’s categorical ban on death penalty sentences for offenders under age eighteen does not extend to those
twenty-five and younger. 126 Additionally, juries are not properly informed of mitigation evidence showing neurological similarities of
youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five with children under eighteen
and the jury thus will not consider age or youth as a mitigating
factor.
Furthermore, it is not sufficient to assume that jurors, as reflections of society’s evolving standards of decency, are already considering eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths. In juvenile death
penalty cases such as Roper, the trial judge instructs the jury to consider youth as a mitigating factor. This judicial instruction is absent
in cases involving eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. 127 It is not the
jury’s responsibility to study the intricacies of complicated brain research or to understand legally-accepted mitigating factors. It is the
system’s duty to communicate this essential information to the jury
and let them decide how the mitigating factor will impact their
sentencing analysis.
By automatically treating youth aged eighteen- to twenty-five as
adults, our system sends a clear message that this group has equivalent moral culpability and should be eligible for our society’s
harshest sentences. With scientific research changing our understanding of neurodevelopment and decision-making processes, the
Supreme Court must repudiate this message by updating the definition of “youth,” or else risk continued violations of the Eighth
Amendment.
III. COORDINATING REFORM THROUGH THE JUDICIARY, STATE
GOVERNMENTS, AND CONGRESS
The Eighth Amendment violations stemming from our system’s
failure to consider the youthfulness of youth aged eighteen- to
twenty-five can and should be remedied by raising the upper age of

126. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
127. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 558 (“During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and
defense counsel addressed Simmons’ age, which the trial judge had instructed the jurors
they could consider as a mitigating factor.”).
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juvenile jurisdiction to age twenty-five. In order for this reform to
be effective, courts, state governments, and Congress should implement reforms designed to work in tandem. If these efforts are
unsuccessful, these violations can still be addressed by mandating
adequate consideration of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds’
diminished culpability throughout criminal proceedings.
A. Remedying the Violation by Raising the Upper Age of Juvenile
Jurisdiction to Twenty-Five
1. The Court’s Role
The Supreme Court must extend Miller, Roper, and Graham to offenders age twenty-five and younger to stop repeated violations of
their Eighth Amendment rights. Both the Eighth Amendment and
the Miller line of cases support this reform. Such a holding would
incentivize state governments to raise the upper age of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five. The Court would make it clear across jurisdictions that treating eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as pure
adults in our criminal justice system offends our Constitution, and
that the Eighth Amendment requires an acknowledgment of
eighteen- to twenty-five year-olds’ youthfulness and lessened culpability throughout their interactions with the criminal justice system.
2. The Role of State Governments
As discussed above, one of the most crucial reforms to aid in
protecting this class is labeling eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as
youth (or even children, kids, or emerging adults) so that youthfulness
is considered at every stage of the process. The most practical and
effective way to do this is by states extending the juvenile jurisdiction majority age to twenty-five. 128 This will send an unambiguous
message that those under twenty-five years old are children who
are less morally culpable than their adult counterparts and will
significantly lessen the risk of disproportionate punishments.
A Supreme Court holding extending the protections of the Miller line of cases to eighteen- to twenty-five year-olds will support this
state-level reform. This doctrinal change will spark the conversa128. Once this change happens, states can then decide how best to effectuate the
change. That may mean having a separate juvenile courtrooms, proceedings, procedures,
jails and prisons for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds or treating them the same as younger
children.
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tion among state legislatures and courts, thus encouraging states to
pass legislation to protect this class and try eighteen- to twenty-fiveyear-olds in juvenile courts. If states continued to try eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds in adult court after this sort of Supreme Court
holding, they would face practical and administrative challenges of
accommodating the Miller, Graham, and Roper protections ad hoc
to this specific group of defendants. This category of offenders
would now require individualized consideration prior to receiving
mandatory life without parole sentences and also would not be
able to receive death penalty sentences. This patchwork of protections in adult court runs the risk of confusion, error, and mistaken
sentencing, requiring additional judicial oversight to prevent
Eighth Amendment violations. These practical challenges will incentivize states to automatically place eighteen- to twenty-five-yearolds into the juvenile courts to promote fairness and judicial efficiency.
To be clear, this solution will not preclude eighteen- to twentyfive-year-olds from being tried in adult court. If a state raises the
majority age of juvenile jurisdiction to age twenty-five, all eighteento twenty-five-year-olds will then be considered a juvenile and initially charged in the juvenile court. However, the current juvenile
system process will not change. A charged youth can still be transferred to adult court if the judge finds it reasonable to do so under
the rules of that specific jurisdiction. Again, the Eighth Amendment violation lies in the failure to consider age at all for eighteento twenty-five-year-olds in the criminal system, which inherently
leads to excessive punishments. If a youth’s age and requisite maturity level are considered prior to the transfer to adult court and
still taken into account throughout the process, this will avoid unwarranted and undeserved punishment.
There are potential administrability concerns with this remedy.
Given that eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds constitute a majority of
criminal charges, 129 requiring individualized review for every one of
them prior to transfer is bound to be a burdensome task for judges. It also generally costs more to try defendants in the juvenile system than in the criminal system. 130 However, the benefits of protecting this class from undeserved punishments far outweigh the
possible costs to the system. We cannot allow repeated constitutional violations for administrative benefit. 131

129.
130.
131.

See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 36, at 53.
Stamm, supra note 35, at 102.
See Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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3. The Congressional Role
The states are entitled to choose the majority age of juvenile jurisdiction. Therefore, there will need to be additional incentive for
states to raise the majority age to twenty-five, rather than choosing
another alternative. Congress should incentivize states to adopt
this new uniform majority jurisdictional age by using their spending power. Criminal law has historically been left to the states,132
and Congress lacks the power to impose a nationwide jurisdictional
age of majority. However, Congress does have the power to incentivize states to adopt a law or provision through the Spending
Clause by attaching “conditions on the receipt of federal funds.” 133
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court upheld Congress conditioning highway funds on states setting the drinking age at twentyone. 134 Not only was this congressional tactic constitutional, it was
effective. 135 Here, Congress could condition funds for the criminal
system, such as those given for courts and prisons, on setting the
floor for adult jurisdiction at age twenty-five. The Record Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment Act of 2017
(REDEEM Act), recently re-introduced to the House in 2019, provides an informative example. 136 The Act incentivizes states to raise
the age of adult criminal responsibility to eighteen by giving preference to state grant applications for certain funding programs to
those “that have set [eighteen] or older as the age of original jurisdiction for adult criminal courts.” 137 Although this Act has not yet
been passed, it shows how Congress can incentivize states to raise
the jurisdictional age minimums.
Congressional incentives must pass constitutional scrutiny. Congress’ spending powers are not unlimited but instead are subject to
restrictions set forth in Dole. 138 These restrictions require conditional spending measures to be in pursuit of the general welfare,
unambiguous as to the funding’s conditions, conditioned by matters related to the national concern, not coercive, and not barred
by any other Constitutional provision. 139 Using the Spending Power

132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system,
the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’” (quoting
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993))).
133. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 211.
136. REDEEM Act, H.R. 2410, 116th Cong. (2019).
137. See Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, Cummings, Nadler, Bass, and
Booker Reintroduce the REDEEM Act (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=
general&id=33.
138. Dole, 483 U.S. 203.
139. Id. at 203.
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to incentivize states to increase the age of juvenile jurisdiction satisfies each of these requirements.
First, protecting eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds in the criminal
justice system is unquestionably in pursuit of the general welfare.
In determining whether a congressional spending measure is “in
pursuit of the general welfare,” reviewing courts only need to find
that the legislation is “reasonably calculated to advance the general
welfare.” 140 Courts defer substantially to Congress’ judgment in answering this question. 141 As set forth in Parts I and II of this Note,
subjecting eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to excessive punishments is morally and constitutionally problematic. If Congress
finds that incentivizing the states to protect this class will reduce
recidivism, keep children from a life of crime, improve economic
output, save money by driving down incarceration rates, and make
our communities safer—all of which would clearly advance the
general welfare—then the courts should defer to that judgment.
Second, the unambiguous requirement can be addressed at the
drafting stage. Congress must simply write the statute to ensure
states know the consequences of their participation in the funding
plan, or lack thereof. 142
Third, the requirement that the spending’s “condition” be directly related to a national concern is easily satisfied. The condition here is prohibiting excessive punishments for youthful offenders in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This condition will
ensure youth are protected from unwarranted criminal punishments by placing them in the correct court system—the juvenile
system that focuses on rehabilitation rather than punishment.
Fourth, Congress can meet the “coercion” prong by limiting the
amount of funds withheld from states who do not adopt the condition. The withholding amount must be small enough to constitute
a “mild encouragement,” rather than being so excessive that “pressure turns into compulsion.” 143
Lastly, states adopting twenty-five as the floor for adult jurisdiction meets the “unexceptional proposition” in third prong as it
does not independently violate any constitutional rights. 144

140. Id. at 208.
141. Id. at 207.
142. Id. at 203.
143. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
144. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[T]he [third prong] . . . stands
for the unexceptionable proposition that the [spending] power may not be used to induce
the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”).
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B. Remedying the Violation by Considering Age
Throughout the Criminal Process
If states do not increase their age of majority to twenty-five, alternative safeguards will be necessary to protect against excessive
punishments. At the bare minimum, age needs to be a considered
factor for eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds throughout their time
with the adult criminal justice system to avoid Eighth Amendment
violations. This will be more of a practical shift than a doctrinal
one. State judicial systems will need to expand their definition of
“youth” to include those twenty-five and younger, and defendants
under twenty-five should receive enhanced protections throughout
their criminal proceedings, from bail to sentencing. 145 District attorneys would be required to consider these defendants’ youthfulness in all prosecutorial decisions, and defense attorneys could use
it to advocate for their client. Even if states do extend the majority
age of jurisdiction to twenty-five, this proposed reform should still
apply if juveniles are transferred to adult court.
Additionally, every criminal justice professional involved in juvenile cases should be required to complete trainings on the differences between juveniles and adults, with up-to-date scientific research explaining how the human brain begins to reach adult
maturity at age twenty-five. Throughout these trainings, eighteento twenty-five-year-olds should be labeled as “youths” and participants should be instructed to treat them as juveniles throughout
their interactions with the criminal justice system accordingly. It
should be made unmistakably clear that these individuals’ brains
are still developing, which contributes to reduced culpability. Defense attorneys should be informed that their client’s youth may
make them distrusting or uncooperative, and that he or she will
need to put in more work to gain his or her client’s trust.
Police officers should take age into account when conducting
interrogations, and must understand that youths are more vulnerable to pressure and may produce false confessions. The judiciary
should also take account of age and corresponding immaturity level at every stage of the criminal justice process, including pleas,
bail, and sentencing. Age should also be taken into account when
reviewing the interrogations, similar to the standard set forth in
JDB v. California. 146 Judges should be sure to label eighteen- to

145. See Cynthia Soohoo, You Have the Right to Remain a Child: The Right to Juvenile Treatment for Youth in Conflict with the Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (explaining
that other countries outside the United States “provide youth with enhanced protections in
the adult system that take their age into account”).
146. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (U.S. 2011).
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twenty-five-year-olds as youths in opinions, sending the message to
society that this is a less culpable group of individuals. Age and developmental maturity should be thoroughly considered prior to
handing out a sentence and should be an explicit, required consideration in sentencing guidelines. Prior to sentencing, juries
should have access to the neurological research and receive a clear
instruction to consider said research during the trial stage. Juries
should be instructed to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor
for sentencing purposes. Taken together, these efforts to include
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds as youths, and not adults, will afford them appropriate treatment throughout the criminal justice
process and will protect against excessive punishments, thus avoiding Eighth Amendment violations.
CONCLUSION
Defendants between ages eighteen- to twenty-five are inadequately protected in the criminal justice system. By automatically
treating this class as “adults,” despite the fact that research suggests
the contrary, these individuals are vulnerable to excessive punishments in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. This Note
advocates for three remedies, which ideally would be implemented
together, to protect against cruel and unusual punishments for
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. First, the Supreme Court must
extend the holdings of Miller, Roper, and Graham to offenders below
age twenty-five. Second, every state should increase their upper age
of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five. Third, Congress should use
their spending power to incentivize states to increase their upper
age of juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five. If states do not implement these reforms, or even if they do, systemic safeguards should
be implemented at every stage in the criminal process to ensure
age is a considered factor.

